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A DOMINANCE APPROACH TO WELL-BEING INEQUALITY ACROSS 
COUNTRIES  
  








This paper proposes a dominance approach to study well-being inequality across 
countries at the world level. We consider a class of well-being indices based on the three 
attributes considered in the HDI (Human Development Index). Indices are required to satisfy 
preference for egalitarian marginal distributions of income, health and education, inclination 
for less correlation between attributes and priority to poor countries for allocating funds to 
improve health and education. We exhibit sufficient conditions which are easy to implement 
to check dominance over the defined class of well-being indices. 
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When comparing countries according to some measure of well-being, the at-
tention has shifted from an assessment based solely on per capita GDP to one
involving several attributes like life expectancy, literacy rates, mortality and
morbidity statistics and other various socioeconomic indicators in addition to
income per capita. Appraising inequality of the distribution of well-being across
countries raises diﬃculties in a multidimensional context. In a casual approach,
the information provided by the attributes describing a country situation is
aggregated in some indicator, which is tantamount to the classical problem of
assessing inequality in a one-dimensional setting. For instance, the best known
measure of well-being the HDI (Human development index) published by UNDP
in their Human Development Report from 1990 to date is based on three at-
tributes: life expectancy at birth, educational attainment and real GDP per
capita. The HDI1 is obtained by placing each country on a scale of 0 to 100
with respect to any attribute and by computing a simple arithmetic mean of the
attributes. But there is no uncontroversial way of aggregating carrots and pota-
toes. It would be more sensible to face the intrinsic multi-dimensional feature of
the problem and to agree on some qualitative properties that a “well-behaved
index” should satisfy. In doing so, on the one hand we leave some room for
disagreement and on the other hand we must cope with a class of well-being
indices2 rather than with a unique index. This kind of problem is common in
inequality analysis. The solution brought by the social dominance approach
pioneered by Kolm (1969), Atkinson (1970) and Sen (1973) is to propose some
comparison criteria for distributions taking into account the indeterminacy of
some aggregating indicator — the utility function in the case of individuals and
the well-being index in the case of countries.
Dominance analysis consists in seeking unanimity among large classes of so-
cial welfare functions over the ranking of pairs of allocations. The social welfare
function, here expressed at the world level is additively separable with respect
to well-being indicators deﬁned at the country level. In short, we propose a
multi-dimensional dominance analysis applied to well-being indicators of the
type of those composing the HDI. Of course, in doing so we accept to be some-
times unable to make a comparison since the obtained criteria are incomplete.
Nevertheless, when we can reach a conclusion, the result is robust and cannot
be easily dismissed.
The literature on multi-dimensioned welfare analysis can be traced back to
Kolm’s paper (1977), where every attribute is considered symmetrically. There
has been a bunch of papers devoted to this topic (see e.g. Marshall and Olkin
(1979, chapter 15), Atkinson and Bourguignon (1982), Le Breton (1986), Ko-
shevoy (1995, 1998), Koshevoy and Mosler (1996), Moyes (1999) and Bazen and
1Each of these dimensions is normalized by a simple procedure. For instance, a number at
x for GDP, means that the log GDP of the country is at x% between two reference values
the min and the max of log GDPs in the pool of countries registered on a given period. This
normalization raises some diﬃculties which are touched on at the end of the paper.
2See, for instance the proposition made by Foster and al.(2003).
3Moyes (2002). In particular, Atkinson and Bourguignon (1982) propose domi-
nance relationships for various classes of utilities deﬁned by their derivatives up
to the fourth order. Nevertheless, it seems fair to say that no simple criterion has
reached popular support among applied economists and even among theoretical
ones to check multi-dimensional dominance.
Here we consider a three-variables distribution problem, which is rather un-
common since the main bulk of the literature has limited its attention to the case
of a bivariate distribution. Section 2 presents the considered class of well-being
indicators. Section 3 provides the result. Finally, Section 4 concludes.
2 A Class of Well-Being Indicators
It is assumed that well-being at a country level is based on the three attributes
considered in the HDI: per capita GDP, life expectancy at birth and educational
attainment. These variables3 are supposed to be continuous and we denote the
joint cumulative distribution function of these three indicators across countries:
F(x1,x 2,x 3), where x1 is per capita GDP, x2 is life expectancy at birth, and
x3 is educational attainment. In the unweighed case, F is simply the cdf of the
distribution at the country level; To make the proofs simpler, we assume that F
admits a density4 f deﬁned on a ﬁnite support X1 ×X2 ×X3 with X1 =[ 0 ,a 1],
X2 =[ 0 ,a 2] and X3 =[ 0 ,a 3]. Using the same notations as Atkinson and









I(x1,x 2,x 3)f(x1,x 2,x 3)dx1dx2dx3,
where I is the well-being function at the country level assumed to be continu-
ously diﬀerentiable to the required degree. The partial derivatives with respect
to each variable are denoted by subscripts. The change in welfare between two








I(x1,x 2,x 3) f(x1,x 2,x 3)dx1dx2dx3 (1)
where  f denotes f − f∗.
Dominance is usually deﬁned as unanimity for a family of social welfare
functions based on a speciﬁc set of well-being functions.
Deﬁnition 1 f dominates f∗ for a family I of well-being functions if and only
if  WI ≥ 0 for all well-being functions I in I.T h i si sd e n o t e dfD I f∗.
3These three variables are supposed to have a cardinal meaning, namely, they are deﬁned
up to any linear transformation.
4This assumption is made for mathematical convenience. In another paper, Muller-Trannoy
(2003), we prove that similar results can be obtained if we drop this assumption.





I : X1 × X2 × X3 → 211d such that
I1,I 2,I 3 ≥ 0;
I11 < 0,I 22 < 0,I 33 < 0;
I12 ≤ 0,I 13 ≤ 0,I 23 =0 ;




With this class, the marginal well-being induced by an increase in any at-
tribute is supposed to be identical across countries. This feature captures a
requirement of anonymity at the country level in the unweighed interpretation
and at the individual level in the weighed interpretation. Thus, a 1$ increase of
the per capita GDP in Zimbabwe is treated on an equal footing as a 1$ increase
of the per capita GDP in China, irrespective of the demographic or economic
size of these countries.
The marginal well-being is positive and decreasing in each dimension. Under
this condition, each attribute is good for welfare and there is a social preference
at the world level for more egalitarian marginal distributions. Dominance for
concave and increasing utility functions in a one dimension setting is known to
be equivalent to the Generalized Lorenz test introduced by Shorrocks (1983).
Therefore, a more egalitarian distribution according to the Generalized Lorenz
test in each dimension appears to be a prerequisite for accepting that welfare
has improved at the world level. If the distributions of each attribute are inde-
pendent, this requirement will be suﬃcient to yield a reasonable criterion. But
we know that our three attributes of interest are positively correlated. Hence,
some assumptions are needed to convey the intuition that a reduction in the
statistical links of these variables improves welfare.
We capture the latter idea for per capita GDP and life expectancy at birth by
imposing a negative sign on the second partial cross-derivative with respect to
these two attributes. The same is required for the second partial cross-derivative
of the well-being function with respect to per capita GDP and education attain-
ment. Strictly speaking, these assumptions indicate that the marginal increase
in well-being associated with a rise in income per capita is decreasing with the
level of the other two variables. They imply that when comparing two equally
poor countries with the same per capita GDP competing for international aid,
priority should be given to the country with the lowest health or educative per-
formance. A consequence of this is that transferring money from rich countries
to poorer countries with worse health or worse education standards is good for
welfare. After such transfers, the distribution of countries according to income
per capita will be less correlated to the distribution of countries according to
one or the two other attributes. Another vindication of this assumption is the
equivalence between assuming that income per capita and health (or education)
are substitutes in well-being. Income can compensate for deﬁciencies in health
and education.
Finally, the nullity of I23 means that the well-being function is additively
separable with respect to life expectancy at birth and educational attainment.
Indeed for the purpose of welfare analysis, it seems sensible, at least in ﬁrst
5approximation, to consider that the marginal gain in welfare of one year of life
expectancy at birth is not aﬀected by the level of education. In other words,
if it can be defended that income can compensate for a bad health or a bad
education, it is less palatable to impose that a good health is a substitute for
a bad education or the opposite. Of course, it can be argued that the better
educated you are, the more able you are to appreciate life but introducing
such an assumption would imply some undesirable conclusion: an international
program transferring resources to improve health conditions would have to be
targeted to countries with the best educational level!
Another argument for ignoring the interactions of life expectancy and edu-
cation in the well-being aggregate indicator is that compensatory transfers are
usually thought to be implemented with money, and not with units of education
or units of health. In that sense, one may want to ignore the interactions of life
expectancy and education in the well-being index because one cannot directly
compensate for their diﬀerences independently of monetary transfers. To close
the discussion of this assumption, let us observe that the HDI which is addi-
tively separable respects this assumption. Under these conditions, the index
can be written in the following form, with ϕ and ψ two three time diﬀerentiable
functions
I(x1,x 2,x 3)=ϕ(x1,x 2)+ψ(x1,x 3) (2)
Even under this separability structure, it is unlikely that one can obtain
dominance criteria with substantial discriminatory power without adding fur-
ther assumptions. This justiﬁes the introduction of the last two assumptions
of positivity of a couple of third partial cross-derivatives. The assumptions are
best understood if we note that minus the value of I12 (respectively I13) can
be interpreted as an index of priority to international aid for compensating low
life expectancy (respectively education attainment). Then requiring that minus
I121 (respectively minus I131) is negative implies that the priority index de-
creases with the country income per capita. In other words, the countries with
the highest claim to international aid for compensating health conditions are
the poorest ones, a somewhat reasonable request. In contrast, it is well-known
that despite a very high share of GDP devoted to health expenses, the US is far
from being the leader in life expectancy among the OECD countries. Improving
health conditions in this country through a programme of international aid does
not seem to command a widespread support, consistently with our hypotheses.
3T h e R e s u l t








f(s,r,t)dsdrdt and the corresponding expressions for F2(x2)





Fi(s)ds, i =1 ,2,3.T h e Hi(.) s describe the usual





F(r,xj,xk)dr and Hi(xi;xj,a k): =Hi(xi;xj) for any
i,j,k. These Hi(xi;xj,x k) s describe univariate second order stochastic domi-
nance terms for the distribution of the xi restricted to the virtual sub-populations
such that the second argument of the utility has value xj and the third argument
has value xk.
The following proposition gives suﬃcient conditions to check dominance ac-
c o r d i n gt oc l a s sI.
Proposition 1 Let f and f∗ be densities.
 Hi(xi) ≤ 0, ∀xi ∈ Xi i =2 ,3 (A)
∆H1(x1;x2) ≤ 0,∀xi ∈ Xi,i =1 ,2 (B)
∆H1(x1;x3) ≤ 0,∀xi ∈ Xi,i =1 ,3. (C)
⇓
fDIf∗
Proof. The argument proceeds by integration by parts. The changes in ranks
of integrations with respect to the diﬀerent variables are justiﬁed by Fubini
theorem, which is not systematically signaled in the steps of the proof.





























Let us call T1 the ﬁr s tt e r mi nt h eR H St e r ma n dT 2 the second term. It is
convenient to treat separately these two terms. We start by integrating T1 by





























We now integrate by parts the RHS of the above expression with respect to
x2. We obtain
7T1 = I(a1,a 2,a 3)∆F(a1,a 2,a 3) −
a2  
0









I32(a1,x 2,x 3)∆F(a1,x 2,x 3)dx2dx3 .
The ﬁrst term in the RHS term is equal to zero because F(a1,a 2,a 3)=
F∗(a1,a 2,a 3)=1 .S i n c eI32 =0 , the last term vanishes. Finally, we integrate
t h es e c o n dt e r mo ft h eR H St e r mo ft h ea b o v ee x p r e s s i o nw i t hr e s p e c tt ox2
and the third term with respect to x3. One yields
T1 = −I2(a1,a 2,a 3)∆H2(a2;a1,a 3)+
a2  
0
I22(a1,x 2,a 3)∆H2(x2;a1,a 3)dx2
−I3(a1,a 2,a 3)∆H3(a3;a1,a 2)+
a3  
0
I33(a1,a 2,x 3)∆H3(x3;a1,a 2)dx3.
Let us now evaluate T2. We start by integrating T2 by parts with respect to






































































































8Finally integrating T2 with respect to x2 one yields






































I1123(x1,x 2,x 3)∆H1(x1;x2,x 3)dx1dx2dx3.
Therefore, the expression for the change in welfare becomes




I11(x1,a 2,a 3)∆H1(x1)dx1 +
a2  
0



































I1123(x1,x 2,x 3)∆H1(x1;x2,x 3)dx1dx2dx3.
9Since the well-being function satisﬁes I23 =0 , and consequently I123 =0and
I1123 =0 , the conclusion follows.
The three families of conditions which guarantee the existence of a domi-
nance relation are easy to be implemented. Conditions (A ) are equivalent to
check dominance according to the Generalized Lorenz test on the marginal dis-
tributions of life expectancy at birth and educational attainment. Moreover,
one has to verify conditions (B) and (C) which are symmetric. Starting from
the joint cdf, one only need to consider its value at the upper bound for the
health variable (respectively educational variable) in the former (respectively
latter) condition. Then, one need to perform a single integration with respect
to the income per capita variable and the value of the integral must be smaller
for the dominant distribution than for the dominated distribution for any couple
of income per capita and life expectancy (respectively educational attainment)
so as to satisfy the former (latter) condition. Note that the last two conditions
imply that the Generalized Lorenz test is also satisﬁe df o rt h ep e rc a p i t aG D P
marginal distribution.
It remains to touch on a diﬃculty raised by the normalization procedure
implemented in order to compute the HDI. The normalization consists on com-
paring the value of each variable with respect to two indicators of reference:
the minimum value registered by a country in the last 38 years, xm,a n dt h e
maximum value expected for the most advanced country during the following
25 years, xM. Hence, for the health and education dimension, the normalized
variable   xi are given by




For the income dimension, the formula provided by Anand and Sen (2000) is
the following




One may ask whether to check dominance conditions A, B and C on the non-
transformed variables xi is suﬃcient to have the same three conditions satisﬁed
on the normalized variables   xi. It is easy established that the answer is positive
when the normalized variables are a linear transformation of the initial ones, a
condition which is violated in the income dimension. Therefore the normalized
procedure matters for obtaining dominance results. Nevertheless, if such a nor-
malization may be easily vindicated when one averages variables expressed in
diﬀerent units, its rationale is far less obvious in the framework of a dominance
approach. Thus, a dominance approach should depart from the HDI type of
indices.
4C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper, we propose a dominance approach to well-being inequality across
countries at the world level. We consider a class of well-being indices based on
10the three attributes considered in the HDI: per capita GDP, life expectancy and
educational attainment. We design conditions that suit these variables: pref-
erence for more equal marginal distributions of income, health and education;
inclination for less correlation between attributes and priority to poor countries
in allocating international aid to improve health and education.
We derive three families of suﬃcient conditions which are easy to implement
in order to check dominance over the deﬁned class of well-being indices. Check-
ing and proving that these conditions are necessary are a matter for further
research. However, we do not claim that the exhibited conditions apply in any
three-dimensional context. For instance, the additive separability assumption
between health and education, which perhaps seems reasonable here, may be
too demanding in another setting. In that case, other appropriate conditions
need to be designed to ﬁt the context of interest.
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